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Abstract
In recent years a lot of criticism  against the main assumptions of economic modeling has 
come to up, this has led to physicists entering the field of economics. By applying models 
originally developed for physics to economics, especially finance, analyzing methods with a 
different approach can be used.
Inspired by earthquakes Didier Sornette created a model that analyze financial market crashes. 
With the theories of power law and log-periodicity he created a model to find the critical point 
prior to the crash and thereby predict when the market is supposed to crash. 
The  main  objective  of this  paper  is  to,  with  the  help  of  Didier  Sornette’s  Crash  Model, 
analyze the possibility to predict market crashes. By fitting this model to OMX Stockholm 30 
I will analyze if the crash of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in 2007 could have been predicted.
After fitting the model to the data set I found that the majority of the crash times were close to 
the real critical point. This leads to the conclusion that the model gives accurate result. To 
have in mind is that times close to the critical point is used as input variables in the fitting 
procedure and thereby could have given misleading result. This could be an area for future 
research in order to increase the reliability in the model. 
Keywords: Didier  Sornette,  market  crash,  power  law,  log-periodicity,  critical  point,  
econophysics, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, OMXS30.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Ever since Benoit Mandelbrot in the early 1960s showed that fluctuations in prices of cotton 
differs from the expected Gaussian distribution,  a lot of criticism against economic models 
has come up [9]. The Gaussian distribution, where each event happens randomly of the others, 
is  one  of  the  main  assumptions  for  market  noise  in  economic  theory. Neither is  the 
assumption of the neoclassical model that agents act in an economic market, which quickly 
reaches  equilibrium,  not  statistical  significant.  Though  agents  more  often  act  out  of 
equilibrium [12 p.16pp]. This creates doubts in economic modeling.
The financial market offers a lot of good-quality statistical data which makes it a grateful field 
for physicists to work in. This with a combination of the scepticism mentioned above has led 
to more and more physics entering the field of economics, especially finance. By applying 
theories and methods originally developed by physicists on economics, a new science named 
econophysics has been born. Both physics and finance are concerned with systems of many 
interacting components that obey certain rules [11].
Financial market crashes has shocked the world economy several times the last century. These 
traumatic events affect millions of people around the world. Yet for several of these crashes 
no clear cause of the crash has been singled out, for instance “Black Monday” the 19th of 
October 1987 (see Johansen, A. & Sornette, D. (1995)). The ongoing Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis which appeared in 2007,  was triggered by a dramatic rise in mortgage delinquencies 
and foreclosures in the United States and later  on spread over the globe [2].  Despite this 
trigger has been singled out, it was after the crash occurred and thereby the disaster could not 
be avoided. What if there were warnings prior to the crash, could it have been avoided?
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1.2 Purpose
The main  objective of  this  paper  is  to,  with  the  help  of  Didier  Sornette’s  Crash  Model, 
analyze the possibility to predict market crashes. At first the model will be introduced and an 
explanation on how the model works will be held. Second the model will be used to analyze 
the ongoing financial Subprime Mortgage Crisis. At last a discussion will be held about if the 
model could have been used to predict the market crash and how it can be used to analyze this 
and future market crashes.
1.3 Delimitations
To analyze the market crash of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis I will use time series data of 
OMX Stockholm 30 (OMXS30), which is a market value-weighted index. The index consists 
of the 30 most traded stocks at Stockholm Stock Exchange [14].
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2 Didier Sornette’s Model
2.1 Introduction 
Extreme events in complex systems are, according to most physicists, related to large natural 
catastrophes  such  as  earthquakes,  volcanic  eruptions,  hurricanes  and  avalanches.  Sornette 
applies  this  science  on  the  financial  market,  which  is  just  another  complex  system with 
dynamical interacting parts. The financial as well as the geological system suffers of extreme 
events which erupt in the shape of market crashes and crisis [13 p.15pp]. Sornette uses the 
concepts of power law, log-periodicity and critical point, which all are founded in physics, to 
explain why and when stock market crashes.
Most  attempts  to  explain  market  crashes  look at  a  very  short  time  scale  and try  to  find 
triggering mechanisms. Sornette suggests  a different point of view where he focuses on a 
longer  scale,  in  other  words  months  and  years  instead  of  hours,  days  and  weeks.  The 
underlying  cause  of  the  collapse  can  be  found  in  an  increasing  build-up  of  cooperative 
speculation, which often leads to price acceleration in the market. This phenomenon is more 
widely known as a “bubble” [13 p.3].
The model has been tested by Sornette and others, for instance Björstedt & Ingelgård. It has 
been proven to be accurate and give significant warnings of when the market will crash [1, 
13].
2.2 The definition of a Market Crash, drawdowns and “outliers”
On “Black Monday” October 19th 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 22.6% in 
a single day which, in the Gaussian world, has a probability of one event every 520 million 
years. However, drops like this have occurred several times the last century, not once every 
million years. This leads to the conclusion of a fatter tail for the distribution. Mandelbrot early 
proposed the Lévy distribution as a replacement, of which the tail is fatter and the probability 
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of extreme  events is larger. Events like this that lies “out” and beyond of what is probable 
according to the Gaussian distribution are called “outliers” [9, 13 p.49pp].
To indicate “outliers” one can measure the cumulative loss from the last maximum to the next 
minimum of  the  price.  This  persistent  decrease  in  the  price  over  consecutive  days  is  the 
definition of a drawdown and is illustrated in Figure 1. Drawdowns and “outliers” can occur 
at the same time, as well as drawdowns occur alone. In Figure 1 all three drops are defined as 
drawdowns but only the first  drop (“Black Monday” the 19th of October 1987) is also an 
“outlier” [8].
Figure 1. Definition of drawdowns, the cumulative loss from the last 
maximum to the next minimum of the price. The first drop 
(“Black Monday” the 19th of October 1987) is also an “outlier” [13 p.52].
As expected  by the  random walk  hypothesis  price  trajectories  from one day to  the  other 
should be uncorrelated.  This means that positive and negative moves can be described as 
tossing a coin and ending up with “heads” or “tails”. The probability for such an event is ½, 
and for two consecutive events for instance negative, negative is ½*½ = ¼. If one continue to 
multiply like this one will notice that for each additional event the probability is divided by 
two. This is the definition of the exponential distribution. To associate to drawdowns, this 
implies that for each additional day the market decreases a drawdown is less probable. It  is 
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convenient to observe this distribution on a logarithmic scale where it becomes a straight line. 
Any deviation  from this  line  will  indicate  that  the  distribution  differs  from the  expected 
exponential distribution [13 p.56].
By looking for drawdowns over consecutive days  instead of daily losses indicates that,  in 
special times, the return from one day to another may not be uncorrelated. The probability of 
a one day loss of 10% is 0.001. A 10% loss over three consecutive days for total 30% occurs 
with a probability of 0.001*0.001*0.001 = 10-9. This kind of market crash will thereby occur 
once every four million years, which obviously isn’t true for the real financial market. The 
conclusion of this is that the assumption of price changes over days being independent and 
uncorrelated is not true and consequently a prediction for future events should therefore  be 
possible [13 p.55].
Sornette tested the appearance of “outliers” in different markets. By the method mentioned 
above, with the exponential distribution as null hypothesis, he showed that several drawdowns 
did not give significant result for the hypothesis of random walk. This supports  that price 
variations should not be uncorrelated for these events. To support his theory Sornette tested 
several  major  world  financial  indices,  the  major  currencies  (in  2001,  US$/DM, Yen and 
CHF),  gold and the  largest  companies  in  the  U.S.  market  in  terms  of  capitalisation.  The 
conclusion  was  that  1%  to  2%  of  the  largest  drawdowns  are  not  all  explained  by  the 
exponential  distribution. Figure 2 shows the distribution of drawdowns for the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average [8].
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Figure 2. Observations from the last century of Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
The number of times given levels of drawdowns has occurred [8].
In several research articles Sornette defines and searches for “outliers” in different markets. In 
my point of view an “outlier” is the same as a market crash, which is a drop that lies “out” of 
what is probable.
2.3 Research prior to the Model 
In several research articles Sornette et al. have shown that the build-up of speculative bubbles 
is established in power law acceleration with log-periodic oscillations [3, 4, 5, 7]. This model 
has been inspired by the analogy with other critical phenomena such as the dependence of the 
released strain on the time to rupture for various large Californian earthquakes [10].
2.3.1 Power Law
To explain the imitation between agents during different market scenarios Sornette uses the 
Ising model. When agents interact with each other certain decisions are made, in this case to 
buy or sell. Agents can thereby imitate each other and make the same decision or the opposite. 
The imitation strength K measures the degree of agreement and imitation of agents. In the 
model there exists a critical point Kc that explains when the cluster of agents is of such size 
that most of them are in agreement. In this point the sensitivity for a small global influence is 
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substantial [13 p.125pp]. A critical point is defined as an explosion to infinity of a quantity 
that normally behaves well.  In research articles the presence of this critical  behaviour has 
been identified in the financial markets [3].
In natural sciences this behaviour is a so called critical phenomenon. This complex system 
where  the  susceptibility  goes  to  infinity  is  described  by  a  power  law  [13  p.126].  The 
mathematical features of a power law are described in section 2.4.
2.3.2 Log-periodicity
The Ising model assumes that the impact on the surrounding of every agent in the system is 
equal. But in real financial markets this is not true thought the size of agents and their funds 
differ,  e.g.  the  decision  of  an  institution,  with  large  influence,  has  greater  impact  on  the 
surrounding than the decision of an individual trader. By introducing hierarchical levels with 
currency blocks (US$, Yen & Euro) at the top, at the next level countries, then major banks 
and so on the model better defines the real market. In this hierarchical network a decision only 
affects agents at the same level. Suppose an individual trader at the bottom makes a decision 
to sell which affects its neighbour, their composed decision gain influence to affect agents on 
the next level  and gain more influence and so on.  This influence between traders and its 
hierarchical structure is illustrated in figure 3 [6].
Figure 3. Influence between traders in a hierarchical structure [6].
A  phenomenon  that  appears  in  this  hierarchical  structure  are  so  called  log-periodic 
oscillations. This means that variables oscillate with increasing frequency when the system 
approaches a certain critical point. The log-frequencies of the oscillations are determined by 
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the influence factor which quantify the time a trader waits until observing the decision of its 
neighbour [13 p.85 & 177pp].
2.4 The mathematical definition
To quantify stock market  behaviour  when it  comes to  financial  crashes  Sornette  uses the 
concept of log-periodic correction of the power law function. The critical phenomenon of the 
crash is explained by an accelerating power law over time:
m
c ttBAtF )()( −+= (1)
Where the parameters A and B are constants moving the equation approximately up and down. 
The critical point tc designate the time at which the curve declines and the crash initiates. The 
power  of  the  function  is  denoted  by the  parameter  m  which,  when increased,  makes  the 
function steeper. 
To explain the endogenous build-up of hierarchical cooperation and imitation in the stock 
market Sornette applies a log-periodic part to equation (1): 
))log(cos()()()( ϕω +−−+−+= ttttCttBAtF cmcmc (2)
Where the parameter  C modifies the magnitude of the log-periodic part and when increased 
the log-periodic oscillations enhance. The angular frequency  ω describes the period of the 
cosine-waves and when increased reduce the period. The last parameter of phase displacement 
φ displaces  the log-periodic  waves along the function.  For a graphical  explanation of the 
model and parameter see Björstedt, M. & Ingelgård, P. (2004) [1, 5, 12 p.334pp].
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2.5 Appliance problem
After several tests made by Sornette et al. he discovered some weaknesses in the model which 
could become present if it is introduced to the market. Assume that the prediction of a crash is 
possible and the model warns for a crash to occur in one or two months from now. This will 
lead to three possible scenarios:
1. Belief in the model is weak and nobody believes the prediction. Due to the assumption 
the market will crash. This would be a victory for the “predictors” but anyway they 
could just be called the “lucky ones” by critics.
2. Belief in the model is strong and everybody accepts the warning. This causes panic 
hence the market crashes. The prediction was true but the market crashes because of 
the panic effect and not the predictive power which makes the model questionable. 
3. Sufficiently many believe the prediction and make some adjustments to counteract. 
Hence the crash does not occur and the model disproves itself. 
None of the three scenarios is desired. In the first two the crash still occurs and in the last 
scenario the prediction disproves itself and hence the model appears to be unpredictable [7]. 
This is a general problem in prediction modelling and is a research area in itself in the field of 
socioeconomics.
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3 Analysis of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will analyze the ongoing Subprime Mortgage Crisis with the help of Didier 
Sornette's crash model, see equation (2). So far many tests on this model have been done by 
Sornette's team on different kinds of stock markets around the globe, though mostly the major 
world  financial  indices  [8].  In  2004 the  model  was  first  implemented  on  Swedish  stock 
market  data  when  Affärsvärldens  Generalindex  (AFGX)  was  analysed  by  Björstedt  & 
Ingelgård [1].
For all calculations and evaluations the program MATLAB has been used. 
3.2 Stock market data
To analyze the crash of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis I have chosen OMX Stockholm 30 
(OMXS30). OMXS30 is a market value-weighted index that consists of the 30 most traded 
stocks at Stockholm Stock Exchange [14]. The time series data consists of daily last trades 
from the 1st of January 2003 until the 31st of December 2008. The data set to be analysed is 
illustrated in figure 4.
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Figure 4. The time series data, daily last trades of OMXS30 from the 
1st of January 2003 until the 31st of December 2008 [14].
To make the data more convenient to analyze I decided to define the data as 250 trading days 
per year, i.e. 250*6 = 1500 trading days in the whole data set. In the sequel, time is sometimes 
converted into decimal year units, i.e. 1/250 = 0.004 years per day.
3.3 Prediction of future events
Sornette discovered the presence of “outliers” in several major world financial indices which 
gave the conclusion that the market may not be uncorrelated hence prediction of future events 
is  possible.  Evidence  of  correlation  was  as  well  found  in  the  Swedish  stock  market  by 
Björstedt & Ingelgård by searching for “outliers” [1, 8].
To identify  correlation  between daily  returns  in  my data  set  I  used  a  similar  method  as 
Sornette. For better accuracy in my result I used a data set with longer data horizon than the 
one illustrated above. This data set stretches over ten years starting from the 1st of January 
1999.  At  first  I  identified  all  drawdowns  larger  than  1% and  for  how long  they  lasted. 
Subsequently I fitted the distribution of drawdowns (DD) by the exponential law:
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cDDDDeNDDN /0)(
−
=  (3)
Where N0 (in my analysis = 326) denotes the total number of drawdowns and DDc (= 0.017) is 
the typical price variation, that is the average negative return divided by two. This exponential 
equation defines the null hypothesis (no correlation between daily returns) and becomes a 
straight line on a logarithmic scale. By comparing the cumulative number of drawdowns for 
specific amplitudes with the null hypothesis one can determine that not all drawdowns can be 
explained by this, see figure 5 [3].
Figure 5. The observed drawdowns (+) in OMXS30 and 
the null hypothesis (straight line), equation (3).
As seen in figure 5 several drawdowns is not explained by the null hypothesis. This leads to 
the conclusion that the null hypothesis  of no correlation between daily returns is rejected, 
hence “outliers” are present in OMXS30. 
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3.4 Fitting the Model
As the fitting procedure has been done before, both by Sornette D. et al. (see Johansen, A. & 
Sornette, D. (1995)) and Björstedt & Ingelgård (see Björstedt, M. & Ingelgård, P. (2004)), I 
will use the conclusions made by them to make the fit as good as possible. 
3.4.1 Fitting procedure
To make a straight forward seven parameter fit was rejected by Björstedt & Ingelgård and 
after trying the same method myself I came  to the same conclusion. Hence I used another 
method by minimizing the square variance:
( )∑
=
−
−
=
N
i
ii tFynN
FVar
1
2)(1)( (4) 
Where n is the number of free variables in F(t), yi is the actual price at time i and F(ti) is the 
price evaluated by the model, in equation (2). The three variables A,  B and C are linear and 
consequently  can  these  be  expressed  as  three  linear  equations  which  can  be  solved 
analytically.  By expressing these explicitly the seven parameters are  narrowed down to the 
four nonlinear variables  m,  tc,  ω and  φ that  are calculated by multiple linear regression of 
equation (4). Because I am performing a highly nonlinear parameter fit with noisy data there 
will in general be several local minima. To find the global minima of the variance I used a 
multidimensional  search  method  called  the  Gauss-Newton  method.  This  method  was 
successfully used by Björstedt & Ingelgård.
3.4.2 Constraints
Sornette et al. discovered that the best fit of the model appeared when the starting point was at 
the  beginning  of  the  bubble  and  the  endpoint  at  the  highest  point  prior  to  the  crash. 
Furthermore the data horizon should be approximately one to two years to give meaningful 
result  [4].  In  further  testing  they  also  found certain  constraining  intervals  for  two of  the 
parameter which are: 0.2 < m < 0.8 and 5 < ω < 15. The phase  φ can not be meaningfully 
limited and tc have to be larger than the last point in the sample data [13 p.335pp].
For the Gauss-Newton method to converge the starting points has to be close to the optimal 
points. Therefore I first tested all possible combinations of m, tc, ω and φ using the constraints 
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above and created a four-dimensional matrix containing the variance from equation (4) of 
each  fit.  By minimizing  this  matrix  I  ended up with good starting  points  for  the  Gauss-
Newton calculation. Using the starting points the Gauss-Newton method searched for local 
optimal points and best fits for the data set. From these local optimums I tried to find the ones 
who where best for my analysis. According to Sornette the value of m should be between 0 
and 1 for the price to accelerate and remain finite [13 p.335]. I also excluded B>0 and results 
that were obviously wrong, for example imaginary numbers. 
3.4.3 Choosing interval
To be able to make the best fit for my data I had to find the beginning of the bubble and the 
highest peak prior to the crash. By studying the data set in figure 4 the highest peak prior to 
the crash (as well the largest value in the whole set) is approximately in the middle of 2007. 
From the figure one can also conclude that the bubble seems to begin sometime in early 2003. 
I also studied a longer data horizon which gave the same conclusion. According to Sornette, 
to get the best  fit,  data  horizons of one to two years  should be used.  On the other  hand 
Björstedt & Ingelgård found the best fit to occur for intervals lasting between 0.8 to 2.4 years. 
For this test I decided to use data horizons of 0.8 to 2.6. 
By finding the maximum value of the data set one can find the starting date 0.8 to 2.6 years 
before this date, which is approximately from the beginning of 2005 until the middle of 2006. 
More exactly this is the interval of 2004.956 to 2006.556. Fitting the model with the starting 
point in this interval with an increment of 0.2 gives me nine different starting points to fit the 
model. For these nine starting points I fitted the model to the data using input crash points tc 
close to (within a week) the maximum value of the set. 
3.4.4 Fitting the model to OMXS30
Fitting the model to OMXS30 for the intervals and with the constraints mentioned  before 
gave several warnings for the market to crash. A total of 50 warnings for crash times from 
2007.52 until 2008.28 was identified, which are illustrated in appendix A. The most frequent 
crash dates  was  between 2007.53 and 2007.55 where 17 of  these warnings occurred,  see 
figure 6.
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Figure 6. Histogram of crash times for the 50 warnings (50 bins).
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4 Discussion and Conclusions
The analysis show several warnings for the market to crash but how do we know that this 
result is accurate? The majority of the warnings occurred in between of 2007.50 and 2007.60. 
Since the maximum value prior to the crash, and in my point of view the time of the crash, 
occurred at  2007.56 these warnings should be considered as acceptable.  More exactly, 17 
warnings or 34% of the warnings occurred in the interval from 2007.53 to 2007.55. This is 
approximately  from three  days  up  to  one week  before  the  real  crash  date.  However,  to 
pinpoint a crash with the deviation of one week is still a good approximation. This leads to the 
conclusion that Didier Sornette’s Crash Model gives useful warnings and could have been 
used to predict The Subprime Mortgage Crisis. 
One can argue if the same result would be found if the actual time of the crash would not have 
been used as an input when fitting the model. Suppose another date would have been used, for 
instance a date far away from the actual time of the crash. Would the majority of the warnings 
still occur close to the critical point or would it only give nonsense results? If the same crash 
points would have been found this would strengthen the reliability in this model significantly. 
My opinion is that this model could be used by agents to determine how probable a crash is at 
a certain time. The model can be illustrated as a type of seismograph for the financial market 
to detect build-up of cooperative behavior prior to market crashes. But to be certain about the 
result  given  by  the  model  I  would  recommend  complementary  analysis  before  taking  a 
decision to adjust for a expected market crash. 
A weakness of this model is that it uses absolute number when searching for market crashes. 
For instance is a drop of ten when the index is at 500 twice as large (in percentage) as a drop 
of ten when the index is at 1000. This means that the model may miss a crash that seems to be 
small but actually is larger in percentage numbers.
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5 Future Research Studies
I have proven Didier Sornette’s Crash Model to be accurate and give significant result, but I 
also have some doubts in my analysis. Further research is necessary to conclude if my result is 
significant. 
First of all it would be interesting to fit the model with crash times that are far away from the 
real critical point to see if the result still is the same. If the result is not the same I would have 
great doubts in the model. Because that would imply that to give accurate result the input 
crash points in the optimization have to be close to the real crash time. In this case crashes can 
only be found close to the time of the crash and thereby would be difficult to avoid.
Another research area is to try speculating in future changes of the financial index and thereby 
get more statistical data for the time series and fit the model to this. Suppose an ascent trend 
in OMXS30 is supposed to stagnate, then quantify this and add to the data and run the fitting 
procedure.  The  new  statistical  data  will  change  the  result  but  this  will  also  add  more 
uncertainty to the analysis because of the speculation. 
In the mathematical sense analyzing a rapid increase in the market is the same as analyzing a 
critical crash but exactly the opposite. This implies that by inverting the model maybe it could 
be used to find the time when a declining market is most likely to turn. But this is only correct 
if the same assumptions prior to the model can be made for the inverted scenario as well.
Another approach would be to analyze different data sets than indices. Since a change in the 
stock market is the outcome of a change somewhere else in the system maybe other data 
should be considered, for instance financial ratios. By unravelling other data the build-up for 
crashes may be detected earlier.  
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Appendix A
This appendix illustrates the result from my fitting of Dider Sornette’s crash model, equation 
(2), for OMXS30 with different time intervals. The crash time tc is chosen from the maximum 
value prior to the crash (that is 2007.56) with the variation of a week. 
A.1 2004.956 to 2007.524
Figure A.1. Sornette’s model fitted to data from 2004.956 to 2007.524
A B C tc m ω φ Var
976,5 -442,0 -38,8 2007,59 0,44 7,0 0,51 1047,1
976,5 -442,0 -38,8 2007,59 0,44 7,0 0,51 1047,1
976,5 -355,0 -13,1 2007,61 0,60 15,6 -1,04 1663,2
976,5 -355,0 -13,1 2007,61 0,60 15,6 -1,04 1663,2
976,5 -620,1 40,1 2007,69 0,35 7,6 2,84 995,8
976,5 -620,2 -40,1 2007,69 0,35 7,6 -0,30 995,8
976,5 -947,4 20,0 2008,09 0,31 20,4 -5,88 1532,7
976,5 -947,4 -20,0 2008,09 0,31 20,4 -9,02 1532,7
Table A.1. The parameters for Sornette’s model to fit data from 2004.956 to 2007.524
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A.2 2005.156 to 2007.524
Figure A.2. Sornette’s model fitted to data from 2005.156 to 2007.524
A B C tc m ω φ Var
995,8 -458,0 -39,3 2007,59 0,43 7,2 0,45 1122,1
995,8 -458,0 -39,3 2007,59 0,43 7,2 0,45 1122,1
995,8 -458,0 39,3 2007,59 0,43 7,2 3,59 1122,1
995,8 -386,2 -14,3 2007,63 0,56 17,1 -1,87 1780,8
995,8 -734,4 -41,2 2007,72 0,30 8,1 -0,60 1051,0
995,8 -1952,4 -23,1 2008,21 0,17 22,8 -11,73 1612,9
995,8 -1952,5 23,1 2008,21 0,17 22,8 -8,59 1612,9
Table A.2. The parameters for Sornette’s model to fit data from 2005.156 to 2007.524
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A.3 2005.356 to 2007.524
Figure A.3. Sornette’s model fitted to data from 2005.356 to 2007.524
A B C tc m ω φ Var
1016,2 -351,6 36,8 2007,53 0,52 9,3 3,45 1424,9
1016,2 -352,2 -36,8 2007,53 0,52 9,3 0,31 1425,0
1016,2 -386,2 -41,8 2007,57 0,53 6,3 0,65 1196,3
1016,2 -386,9 -41,8 2007,57 0,53 6,3 0,65 1196,4
1016,2 -425,6 -12,9 2007,66 0,50 18,0 -2,44 1921,3
1016,2 -862,2 -40,9 2007,74 0,25 8,4 -0,80 1131,2
1016,2 -863,3 -40,9 2007,74 0,25 8,4 -0,81 1131,2
1016,2 -863,8 -40,9 2007,74 0,25 8,4 -0,81 1131,2
1016,2 -13245,9 23,7 2008,28 0,03 24,1 -10,27 1733,8
Table A.3. The parameters for Sornette’s model to fit data from 2005.356 to 2007.524
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A.4 2005.556 to 2007.524
Figure A.4. Sornette’s model fitted to data from 2005.556 to 2007.524
A B C tc m ω φ Var
1037,4 -327,7 -52,4 2007,55 0,70 5,8 0,81 1228,9
1037,4 -327,7 -52,4 2007,55 0,70 5,8 0,81 1228,9
1037,4 -327,8 -52,4 2007,55 0,70 5,8 0,81 1228,9
1037,4 -462,5 42,2 2007,57 0,38 11,1 2,96 1321,3
1037,4 -462,5 -42,2 2007,57 0,38 11,1 -0,18 1321,3
1037,4 -462,5 -42,2 2007,57 0,38 11,1 -0,18 1321,3
1037,4 -882,7 -41,6 2007,75 0,25 8,6 -0,89 1213,3
Table A.4. The parameters for Sornette’s model to fit data from 2005.556 to 2007.524
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A.5 2005.756 to 2007.524
Figure A.5. Sornette’s model fitted to data from 2005.756 to 2007.524
A B C tc m ω φ Var
1057,1 -301,2 -67,8 2007,52 0,82 6,5 1,00 1106,5
1057,1 -292,9 -71,7 2007,52 0,90 6,1 1,01 1070,6
1057,1 -292,6 -72,4 2007,52 0,92 5,9 1,04 1069,5
1057,1 -392,0 -45,0 2007,55 0,46 10,4 0,09 1442,3
1057,1 -392,0 -45,0 2007,55 0,46 10,4 0,09 1442,3
1057,1 -392,2 -45,0 2007,55 0,46 10,4 0,09 1442,3
1057,1 -392,2 45,0 2007,55 0,46 10,4 3,23 1442,3
Table A.5. The parameters for Sornette’s model to fit data from 2005.756 to 2007.524
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A.6 2005.956 to 2007.524
Figure A.6. Sornette’s model fitted to data from 2005.956 to 2007.524
A B C tc m ω φ Var
1077,4 -285,5 -73,4 2007,52 0,93 7,9 0,79 1305,9
1077,4 -299,8 -76,0 2007,52 0,90 6,8 1,05 1119,9
1077,4 -297,7 -68,5 2007,52 0,81 8,9 0,58 1343,4
1077,4 -303,2 -67,9 2007,52 0,76 9,8 0,46 1296,2
1077,4 -306,7 -67,5 2007,52 0,74 9,7 0,45 1294,3
1077,4 -306,5 -67,5 2007,52 0,74 9,7 0,45 1294,3
1077,4 -305,8 67,5 2007,52 0,75 9,7 3,58 1294,7
Table A.6. The parameters for Sornette’s model to fit data from 2005.956 to 2007.524
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A.7 2006.156 to 2007.524
Figure A.7. Sornette’s model fitted to data from 2006.156 to 2007.524
A B C tc m ω φ Var
1094,6 -295,5 -85,6 2007,52 0,98 10,5 0,68 1012,3
1094,6 -295,9 85,4 2007,52 0,97 10,5 3,82 1012,5
1094,6 -308,2 67,5 2007,52 0,81 13,1 3,51 1684,5
1094,6 -295,2 -85,8 2007,52 0,98 10,5 0,68 1011,8
1094,6 -295,6 -85,6 2007,52 0,97 10,5 0,67 1012,1
Table A.7. The parameters for Sornette’s model to fit data from 2006.156 to 2007.524
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A.8 2006.356 to 2007.524
No meaningful result could be found in this data interval.
A.9 2006.556 to 2007.524
No meaningful result could be found in this data interval.
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